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The Evolution of a Legal Rule 
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Abstract 
 
Efficient legal rules are central to efficient resource allocation in a market economy. But 
the question whether the common law actually converges to efficiency in commercial 
areas has remained empirically untested. We create a dataset of 461 state-court appellate 
decisions involving the economic loss rule in construction disputes and trace the 
evolution of this law from 1970 to 2005. We find that the law did not converge to any 
stable resting point and evolved differently in different states. Legal evolution is 
influenced by plaintiffs’ choice of which legal claims to make, the relative economic 
power of the parties, and nonbinding federal precedent. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
  We investigate the evolution of a particular common law rule pertaining to the 
construction industry, as developed by state appellate courts in the United States over the 
last three and a half decades. The evolution and efficiency of legal rules governing 
commercial activity are central to understanding a market economy. As long as property 
rights are well defined and private parties whose behavior affects each other can freely 
contract over their conduct at low cost, they will agree to act efficiently (Coase 1960). 
Efficient behavior maximizes total surplus, which parties can agree to divide between 
themselves via contract. But when negotiating explicit contracts is costly, efficient 
resource allocation may require that the law create rules that give parties incentives to act 
efficiently—rules that steer parties to outcomes that mimic those that the market would 
produce if transaction costs were low. Hence the need for efficient legal rules.  
In a common law system such as that of the United States, many legal rules are 
created by judges as a byproduct of deciding appeals. Scholars in law and economics 
have sought to understand why common law rules might be efficient. Posner (1973) 
recognized the importance of this question and argued that appellate judges have career 
or other personal incentives to maximize efficiency. Rubin (1977) and Priest (1977) 
argued that because inefficient legal rules lead to inefficient outcomes, they are more 
likely to be challenged in court. Such litigation is likely to drive them out in favor of 
efficient rules, even when judges do not consciously pursue efficiency (see also Cooter, 
Kornhauser, and Lane 1979).  
These arguments do not come to grips with the legal realist criticism that judges 
have policy preferences other than social welfare or disagree about what serves social   3
welfare. A considerable empirical literature concludes that judges often pursue political 
objectives (George and Epstein 1992, Brenner and Spaeth 1995, Songer and Lindquist 
1996, Hansford and Spriggs 2006, Landes and Posner 2007), and when they do, the case 
for the efficiency of common law is harder to make. Nevertheless, one can still argue, in 
the spirit of Cardozo (1921), that the law evolves toward better rules through sequential 
decisions of judges with diverse preferences (see also: Holmes 1897, Frank 1930, 
Llewellyn 1951, Stone 1985, and Posner 2005).
2 
Yet most of the discussion of the efficiency of legal rules remains theoretical, 
with few empirical studies of how the law evolves in commercial fields that particularly 
matter for the efficiency of resource allocation. That is the gap we try to fill. The doctrine 
we have chosen for our study is the “economic loss rule” (ELR), and the context is its 
application to a homogeneous universe of construction disputes. We ask whether the 
courts have adhered to the ELR (with some standard exceptions that might be necessary 
to make the rule efficient) in that industry, and, if not, how the pattern of adherence and 
nonadherence has evolved.  
Stated at its broadest, the ELR excludes tort liability for “economic loss” unless 
that loss is accompanied by personal injury or property damage. “Economic loss” means 
a loss that is not a personal injury or property damage. So if the builder of a house installs 
windows negligently, with the result that they do not keep out the rain, the owner cannot 
sue the builder in tort for the cost of re-installing the windows carefully, because the loss 
                                                 
2 Gennaioli and Shleifer (2007) show that because appellate courts tend to distinguish prior cases from 
current ones on the basis of information generated by the latter, rather than overruling the prior cases and 
thus losing the knowledge generated by them, sequential decision making leads to the refinement of the law 
over time, and thereby improves its efficiency on average even when full efficiency is not attained.   4
is purely “economic.”
3 In contrast, if the water that seeps into the house because of the 
badly installed windows damages furniture (i.e., causes damage to property other than 
what the builder sold you), the owner can sue the builder in tort.  
The antecedents of the ELR are old,
4 but in the context of liability resulting from 
a product defect the doctrine was first clearly articulated in the 1960s by the Supreme 
Court of California in Seely v. White Motor Co.
5 The plaintiff had bought a truck with 
defective brakes. The truck overturned, but the plaintiff was not hurt; nor was there 
damage to any other property. He sued in both contract and tort to recover repair costs 
and lost profits. The court held that the plaintiff was limited to suing for breach of 
warranty, essentially a contractual remedy.
6  
The ELR was first applied to construction disputes in the 1970s; we have found 
no earlier precedents.
7 Most construction activity is governed by contract, but there are 
two principal types of case in which tort claims, and therefore the ELR, become relevant. 
In the first, a property owner sues in tort for economic loss when he has no contract claim 
or when he wants to make additional claims, exploiting procedural or remedial 
advantages of tort over contract suits. In the second type of case, a builder sues other 
                                                 
3 You may of course be able to recover the cost of repairing or replacing the windows in a suit for breach of 
contract or warranty. 
4 An early U.S. case is Anthony v Slaid, 52 Mass. 290 (1846). An important early statement of the rule is 
Holmes’s opinion for the Supreme Court in Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303, 308–310 
(1927), an admiralty case. The most famous case announcing the fundamental principle is Ultramares 
Corp. v Touche, 255 N.Y. 170 (1931), which held in an opinion by Chief Judge Cardozo that an accountant 
owes no duty to third parties, such as lenders, to refrain from negligently causing economic injury as a 
result of a third party’s reliance on the accountant’s audit of a firm in which the third party invested or to 
which it made a loan. Feldthusen (2000) provides a detailed historical analysis of tort recovery for 
economic losses in various common law countries. The arguments for limiting recovery in tort for 
economic loss are analyzed in Bishop (1982), Rabin (1985), Goldberg (1994), and Posner (2006).  
5 63 Cal. 2d 9 (1965). 
6 Seely actually recovered for both the repairs of the truck and lost profits under his warranty, but the case 
is important because it established the legal rule with respect to recovery for economic loss in tort. We 
discuss the role of contracts in the application of the ELR in Section 4.  
7 See Barrett (1989) for a discussion of early ELR cases in the construction industry.    5
builders, architects, engineers, inspectors, or manufacturers for damages resulting from 
negligence. We investigate how state appellate courts have dealt with such cases.
8 Our 
sample contains all the 461 state appellate decisions between 1970 and 2005 that we 
could find: enough to reach some conclusions on how the law evolves but not so many as 
to make the project unmanageable.
  
We emphasize that our sample of cases – cases involving the application of the 
ELR to construction disputes in the United States – is homogeneous.  Research in law 
and economics, including comparative work by Busani and Palmer, eds. (2003), Busani, 
Palmer, and Parisi (2003), Dari-Mattiacci and Schafer (2007), Gomez and Schafer 
(2007), and Parisi, Palmer, and Bussani (2007), confirms that the ELR covers diverse 
situations in which courts consider whether to allow recovery in tort for “economic loss”.  
Examples include a store owner who loses customers because of an accident in front of 
his store, and a business having to shut down because of accidental damage to electric 
lines resulting from construction activity several miles away (Posner 2006).  Many of 
these are situations in which a contractual resolution is infeasible because of prohibitive 
transaction costs.  We confine our study to one industry, and in all but 11 cases in our 
sample the plaintiff either is or could be in a contractual relationship with the defendant. 
In many ELR cases,
9 the efficiency justification for the ELR is that it protects parties 
engaged in normal business conduct from unpredictable tort claims from strangers if an 
accident occurs. In construction disputes, the plaintiffs and the defendants are not 
                                                 
8 Cases at the trial level are rarely decided in judicial opinions that explain the factual and legal issues fully. 
And opinions at the trial-court level have very limited impact on the evolution of legal doctrine, because 
they are not considered precedents, i.e., authorities, binding courts in subsequent decisions. 
9 Such as Ultramares. See note 4 above.   6
strangers, so this argument does not apply. Our sample is focused on the product liability 
sphere of application of the ELR on the border of contract and tort emanating from Seely.   
The theoretical case for the efficiency of the ELR in contractual settings rests on 
the feasibility of anticipating such disputes through explicit contracting. As Posner (1973) 
pointed out, courts prefer parties to govern their relationships through privately 
negotiated contracts rather than through tort suits whenever transaction costs are low 
enough, because the parties know their business better than the judges can. He reiterated 
this logic as a judge in applying a bright-line ELR in Miller v. United States Steel Corp.: 
“tort law is a superfluous and inapt tool for resolving purely commercial disputes. We 
have a body of law designed for such disputes. It is called contract law.”
10 Because we 
are studying the ELR in cases in which parties do have an opportunity to contract, the 
refusal to allow the parties to bypass contract and thrust the allocative decision on the 
courts by invoking tort law is probably efficient. But this logic behind the ELR implies 
denial of monetary recovery to some persons harmed by wrongful acts, and that troubles 
some courts.
11  
Even in a homogeneous field, such as the application of the ELR to construction 
disputes, we need to specify what is an “efficient” ELR doctrine. One possibility is that 
efficiency requires applying the ELR with no exceptions at all (call this the strict view). 
On this view, if the law converges to efficiency, appellate courts should increasingly be 
refusing to allow any exceptions to the ELR. Another view is that efficiency admits 
                                                 
10 902 F.2d 573, 574 (7th Cir. 1990). 
11 An example is the 1965 New Jersey case of Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, in which a 
consumer recovered tort damages from a carpet manufacturer because the carpet had a defect. The dealer 
from whom he had bought the carpet had gone out of business before the consumer realized that the defect 
could not be fixed, so the dealer’s warranty was of no value to him; and there was no manufacturer’s 
warranty. We do not know whether the New Jersey court was moved by an alternative view of efficiency or 
by sympathy for the plaintiff, but it rejected the ELR.    7
several exceptions, specifically the ones that are generally recognized by most courts 
(call this the middle view). One such exception is fraud (the deliberate infliction of 
economic loss), and another is economic loss that accompanies a personal injury or 
physical damage; these situations are difficult to anticipate and make provision for by 
contract.  The generally recognized exceptions essentially add standard default terms to 
private agreements and by doing so economize on transaction costs. Under the middle 
view, if the law converges to efficiency, over time courts should be refusing to make 
exceptions to the ELR other than the generally recognized ones. Thus, if we find that, 
over time, appellate courts not only fail to reduce the use of exceptions to the ELR but 
also fail to reduce the use of those exceptions that are not generally recognized, we will 
have evidence against convergence to efficiency, according to the middle view.   
A third view of efficiency is that courts have more information about cases than 
researchers do, and so the application of the ELR and its exceptions is contingent on 
specific facts of the case (call this the broad view) invisible to research based on 
aggregated data. Our data allow us to test both the strict and the middle view, but the 
broad view flexibly enough interpreted is untestable by the methods we use.  Having said 
this, we will show in our empirical analysis just how elastic the broad view must be to be 
consistent with the data: different state appellate courts (or the same courts at different 
times) issue contradictory rulings in cases that appear to be nearly identical. We also 
present evidence of unusually high rates of dissent when courts adopt exceptions that 
courts in other states do not recognize.  
  In studying the evolution of the ELR in construction disputes, we first consider 
both the bright-line ELR (strict view) and the ELR with generally recognized exceptions   8
(middle view) as candidates for the efficient rule, and ask whether the law achieves or 
moves toward either of them. Then we ask more generally whether the law converges 
over time to any resting point. If it does not, in an environment that is basically 
stationary, it becomes harder to argue that the law tends toward efficiency.   
We also look at the evolution of the law in different jurisdictions. Under the 
assumption that legal rules relating to construction should not efficiently vary across 
jurisdictions, large differences in the patterns of legal evolution across jurisdictions 
would argue against an inference of efficient judicial rulemaking under all three of our 
conceptions of efficiency.  
  To summarize the results, over our sample period the law did not converge to the 
bright-line (strict) ELR, to the ELR with generally recognized exceptions, or to any other 
resting point. While there is some tendency to convergence in the first 25 years of the 
sample, in the last decade courts increasingly have created idiosyncratic exceptions to the 
ELR – exceptions adopted in only a few jurisdictions and rejected in others. Moreover, 
while adherence to the ELR in some form has grown in some states in others it has 
shrunk. These results are inconsistent with theories of efficient judicial lawmaking as 
well as with other theories that would predict that laws across states should converge. A 
tendency of judges to imitate decisions in other jurisdictions, for example, would bias 
against any finding of nonconvergence. 
  The ELR in construction deals with the important but fuzzy border between 
contract and tort, and legal scholars debate which field should cover particular situations 
in the border region (see Rubin 1993, Edlin and Schwartz 2000). For less controversial 
doctrines, courts would find it easier to agree on what would be efficient outcomes, and   9
so there would be faster and more complete convergence. But no one doubts that 
efficiency has some domain in law; the interesting question is whether courts can 
converge to stable rules in the numerous areas of law in which there is room for 
disagreement about efficiency or equity. The ELR is one such area. 
  The next section describes the data. In Section 3, we present basic trends in the 
use of exceptions to the ELR by state appellate courts. Section 4 looks behind the trends 
to ask whether they reflect changes in plaintiffs’ claims, the presence of explicit 
contracts, the economic power of the parties, or leadership by the U.S. Supreme Court. 
We also check how much variation there is across states. 
 
2. DATA 
2.1 Overview of the Database 
We gathered data on state appellate decisions in all the construction cases 
involving the ELR that we were able to find, a total of 461 cases (see Appendix for 
details). Even though appellate cases represent a tiny minority of all disputes, they 
contain the only authoritative statements of legal doctrine. There is no other body of data 
on which to base a study of the evolution of the rule.  
A study like ours must immediately consider the effects of selection of disputes 
for appeal on our findings.  To be specific, w e m ust ask: is it possib le that th e law 
converges over time to efficient legal rules, but because of how cases are selected, our 
data reveal no convergence?  We believe that the answer is no.  
The selection of disputes could be a problem if we were trying to infer judicial 
support for the ELR from the frequency with which a plaintiff prevailed in a suit in which   10
the ELR was invoked. For then we would have to consider the bearing of the Priest-Klein 
hypothesis that because uncertainty increases the likelihood that a case will be litigated to 
judgment and then appealed, rather than settled or abandoned, the win rates of appellants 
and appellees will tend to equality. We would also have to examine factors, such as 
asymmetric gains from litigation or asymmetric information, that refute the Priest-Klein 
hypothesis in numerous areas of law (Priest and Klein 1984; see also Shavell 1996; 
Kessler, Meites, and Miller 1996; Eisenberg and Farber 1997).  But the selection effect 
should not distort the accuracy with which appellate decisions state the legal rules that are 
applied to resolve a dispute.  We determine legal doctrine directly rather than inferring it 
from the rate of plaintiff victories.   
A more subtle selection effect is suggested by Parisi and Fon (2009), who argue 
that plaintiffs have some information about the political predispositions of judges, and 
therefore cases selected for litigation tend to reflect judges’ political preferences.  As a 
consequence, the law might evolve differently in different states, with the differences 
determined by the politics of different state judiciaries rather than by efficiency. The 
implication for our analysis is that the number of suits, number of plaintiff wins, and 
number of idiosyncratic exceptions would all grow over time in liberal states relative to 
conservative ones. A finding that differences in the ELR across states in construction 
disputes were not explicable in efficiency terms would be consistent with the Parisi-Fon 
hypothesis, but would not undermine the rejection of the null hypothesis that the law 
converges to efficiency.  
We have read the 461 cases in our sample and extracted our variables from the 
judicial opinion in each case. We coded the state in which each decision in our sample   11
was rendered, the date of the decision, and the level of the court (whether the state’s 
highest court or a lower appellate court). We did not include information about individual 
judges. We classified the parties as (1) property owner; (2) builder (such as general 
contractors and subcontractors); (3) architect, engineer, or inspector; (4) manufacturer; 
and (5) other (real estate agent, insurance company, or bank). We noted whether the 
plaintiff and the defendant were parties to a contract and whether any contractual claims 
were made by the plaintiff (breach of contract, breach of express warranty, or breach of 
implied warranty), as well as the outcomes of such claims on trial and on appeal.  
Our primary interest, however, is in the use of exceptions to the ELR by the court 
in tort claims. We use data about the specifics of such claims to investigate whether the 
appellate court applied an exception to the ELR to permit a tort claim to be made. That is 
a test for adherence to the strict view. The nature of the exceptions applied provides the 
test for the middle view.
12   
2.2 Coding the Reasons for Not Applying the ELR 
The different types of exception are summarized in Table 1. We recorded only the 
primary exception to the ELR applied by the court. We distinguish between two 
categories of exceptions: (1) generally recognized exceptions; and (2) idiosyncratic 
exceptions.   The term “generally recognized exception” means that the exception is 
found in the vast majority of jurisdictions but does not necessarily mean that all cases 
                                                 
12 The fact that an exception is applied does not necessarily mean that the plaintiff can recover damages. 
The appellate court might return the case to a lower court to consider other defenses, assess damages, or 
resolve other issues essential to a final resolution of the litigation.     12
from all jurisdictions have accepted it.
13  Under the middle view of efficiency, courts 
should apply only generally recognized exceptions to defeat invocation of the ELR. 
Generally recognized 
exceptions 
•  Other property  
•  Independent torts 
•  Generally recognized independent duties 
o  Statutory independent duties 
o  Architect’s independent duty to a general contractor under 
the Restatement on Torts 
Idiosyncratic 
exceptions 
•  Idiosyncratic independent duties 
o  Builders owing an independent duty to property owners 
o  Builders owing an independent duty to other builders 
o  Architects owing an independent duty to property owners 
o  Architects owing an independent duty to subcontractors 
o  Manufacturers owing a independent duty to property owners 
•  Other reasons 
o  The plaintiff does not have a contractual remedy 
o  The economic loss rule applies only to commercial plaintiffs 
o  The economic loss rule does not apply to negligence claims 
o  Sudden and calamitous event poses unreasonable risk of 
injury 
Table 1: Distinction between generally recognized exceptions and exceptions that are idiosyncratic. 
 
There are three kinds of generally recognized exception: 
Independent Torts: Intentional wrongdoing is a generally recognized exception to 
the ELR. For example, when the defendant fraudulently induces the plaintiff to sign a 
contract, the ELR does not bar him from suing the defendant in tort for fraud.  
Other Property: The ELR precludes only recovery of economic loss 
unaccompanied by any other form of injury. Plaintiffs may be permitted to recover 
economic loss in tort if they also suffer personal injury or property damage.  So if a 
defective product causes injury to the plaintiff or damage to his property, he can sue in 
                                                 
13  For example, we have coded fraudulent inducement as a “generally recognized exception” even though 
in two cases in our dataset fraudulent inducement was held not to constitute an exception. One was 
overruled a year later; the other was based on a statutory exception.  In Woodson v. Martin, 663 So. 2d 
1327 (Fla. 1995), the Florida court held that any misrepresentations of the defects in the house caused only 
economic losses. This was overruled in Wassall v. W H Payne, 682 So. 2d 678 (Fla. 1996) and has been 
disapproved in a number of other Florida cases. In Flagg Energy Development Corp. v. General Motors 
Corp., 244 Conn. 126, 151–55 (1998),  the Connecticut court dismissed the claim for fraudulent 
misrepresentation, but while mentioning the ELR the court actually based its decision on an interpretation 
of the Uniform Commercial Code. The case has not been overruled.   13
tort for the damage to the defective product itself, invoking the other-property 
exception.
14  
Generally Recognized-Independent Duties: Courts have recognized exceptions to 
ELR when defendants owe a duty that is independent of any contract. Many of these 
exceptions are idiosyncratic, but two are generally recognized. First, as noted in section 
552 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, architects have an independent tort duty to 
avoid inflicting economic loss on a general contractor. This seems an efficient way of 
avoiding making architects contract separately with builders when both have already 
contracted with the owner. Second, several states have imposed statutory duties on these 
and other participants in construction, thus curtailing the common law ELR. For example, 
Florida has imposed a number of statutory duties on builders, architects, and inspectors. 
Section 553.84 of Florida Statutes (1995) provides a cause of action for economic loss 
when a builder has caused a loss to a property owner by violating a building code or 
failing to obtain required permits. This duty is independent of any other available ground 
for a remedy.  
Courts have carved out additional exceptions, which we call idiosyncratic, also 
summarized in Table 1. These are exceptions peculiar to a few states or not uniformly 
recognized even within the same state. The label “idiosyncratic” does not refer to 
innovations as such (as in Gennaioli and Shleifer 2007); it merely denotes exceptions 
rejected by other courts. For each case that we classify as decided on the basis of an 
idiosyncratic exception, there is a factually similar case in which the ELR was applied. 
                                                 
14 State courts vary in their application of this exception. For simplicity, we classify all applications of the 
other-property exception as generally recognized.   14
Most of the idiosyncratic exceptions are independent duties created by courts. A 
few courts subject builders or architects to a tort duty to property owners or 
subcontractors. For example, the courts in Colorado have consistently held that builders 
owe property owners a tort duty independent of the ELR. Most courts, however, have 
rejected this view, including courts in neighboring Utah.
15 Likewise Virginia does not 
impose duties on builders toward property owners, while neighboring West Virginia and 
Maryland do.
16 Sometimes cases recognizing an idiosyncratic exception are inconsistent 
with other cases in the same state. In an early Illinois case, an architect was held to owe 
an independent duty to purchasers of residential property, but most Illinois cases apply 
the ELR in such cases.
17 Similarly, Florida imposed duties to property owners on 
architects, overturning cases that had held that no such duties existed.
18 
Some courts recognize an exception for cases in which the plaintiff has no 
contractual remedy, or confine the ELR to commercial but not to residential property 
owners. These exceptions, which seem motivated by sympathy for harmed plaintiffs 
seemingly barred by the ELR, are rejected by other courts. It is difficult to reconcile 
                                                 
15 See e.g., A.C. Excavating v. Yacht Club II Homeowner’s Ass’n, 114 P.3d 862 (Colo. 2005), for an 
example of a Colorado court holding that a builder owes a duty in tort to a homeowner association, and 
Snow Flower Homeowner’s Ass’n v. Snow Flower, 2001 UT. App. 207, for a factually similar case from 
Utah holding that no such duty exists. 
16 See e.g., Sensenbrenner v. Rust, Orling & Neale, Architects, Inc., 236 Va. 419 (1988), holding that the 
defendant builder did not owe a duty to plaintiff homeowners. Similar cases in West Virginia (see e.g., 
Sewell v. Gregory 179 W.Va. 585 (1988)) and Maryland (see e.g., Council of Co-Owners Atlantis 
Condominium, Inc. v. Whiting-Turner Contracting Co., 308 Md.18 (1986), carved out exceptions for 
defendant builders in certain circumstances. 
17 Ferentchak v. Frankfort, 121 Ill. App. 3d 599 (1984), was the early architect case. The similar cases from 
Illinois that upheld the ELR are Illinois Housing Development Authority v. M-Z Construction Corp., 110 
Ill. App. 3d 129 (1982); 2314 Lincoln Park West Condominium Association v. Mann, Gil, Ebel & Frazier, 
Ltd., 136 Ill. 2d 302 (1990); and Martusciello v. JDS Homes, Inc., 361 Ill. App. 3d 568 (2005). 
18 In 1999, the Florida Supreme Court allowed a plaintiff home purchaser to make a claim in negligence 
against the defendant architect-engineer who had failed to discover structural defects (Moransais v. 
Heathman, 744 So.2d 973 (Fla. 1999)). This holding conflicted with earlier Florida case law, where these 
duties were not recognized (see, e.g., Sandarac Ass’n v W.R. Frizzell Architects, Inc., 609 So.2d 1349 (Fla. 
2d DCA 1992) and Ocean Ritz of Daytona Condominium v G.G.V. Assoc., Ltd., 710 So.2d 702 (Fla. 5
th 
DCA 1998).    15
idiosyncratic exceptions with the view that different legal rules are efficient in different 
states at the same time, or in the same state at different times, since construction is a 
stable industry, similar across states, with no significant technological change during the 
period covered by our sample.   
Table 2 summarizes how we use the exceptions to test our hypotheses. Under the 
strict view of efficiency, decisions by appellate courts over time should eliminate 
exceptions. Under the middle view of efficiency, they should eliminate idiosyncratic 
exceptions but not generally recognized ones.
19 Under the broad view of efficiency, as 
well as under the hypothesis that the law does not converge to efficiency over time, we 
should not expect to see systematic diminution in the employment of exceptions.  
Candidate view of 
efficient rule 
Which exceptions are 
contradictory to this view of 
efficiency? 
What does convergence to the 
candidate efficient rule look 
like? 
STRICT VIEW 
(Bright-line ELR with no 
exceptions) 
All exceptions  The use of all exceptions should 
be declining over time 
 
MIDDLE VIEW 
(ELR with generally 
recognized exceptions) 
Idiosyncratic  exceptions  The use of idiosyncratic 
exceptions should be declining 
over time 
Table 2: How we use the incidence of exceptions to test our hypotheses.  
2.3 Brief Summary of the Data 
Cases are not distributed uniformly across the years 1970-2005 covered by the 
dataset. In some years we have no observations, while the maximum number of cases in 
                                                 
19 We have considered alternative procedures for measuring convergence. For example, an alternative way 
of testing convergence to the middle view of efficiency would use state-by-year observations with a 
dummy dependent variable that measures the position of the law of each state in each year. The dependent 
variable would take the value 1 if the state adopts the ELR with generally recognized exceptions and 0 if 
the state uses idiosyncratic exceptions. Convergence to the middle view could be measured by testing 
whether the standard deviation across states converges to 0 over time.  However, this methodology presents 
problems. We have a number of different idiosyncratic exceptions; and, importantly, different states use 
different idiosyncratic exceptions. If a state uses just one of these idiosyncratic exceptions, this alternative 
methodology suggests that we code the position of the law in that state as 0. This may lead to problems if a 
state judiciary generally adheres to the middle view of efficiency but in one outlying case uses an 
idiosyncratic exception. The dependent variable would fail to describe the law of the state accurately. The 
methodology that we use in this paper tracks each case as it occurs. It is a more direct method of addressing 
the issue of whether courts are increasing or decreasing their use of these different idiosyncratic exceptions.      16
one year is 28. Figure 1, which plots the number of cases each year, reveals a clear 
upward trend in appeals cases in which ELR is mentioned. The growth in the number of 
cases is affected by our search strategy in constructing the dataset. Many construction 
cases from the 1970s and 1980s do not refer to the ELR explicitly and hence are not 
included in our sample. The result is to bias the plaintiffs’ success rate downward in the 
early years, since a plaintiff is more likely to have recovered economic damages in a case 
in which the ELR is not mentioned than in one in which it was.  
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Figure 1: Number of cases in each year of our dataset. 
 
In the majority of cases, a plaintiff property owner is suing a builder, architect, 
engineer, inspector, or manufacturer. In 328 cases (71.15%), the plaintiff is a property 
owner. Builders are the only other significant plaintiff category (involved in 25.81% of 
the cases). The most frequent defendants are builders (involved in 34.71% of all cases), 
followed by manufacturers (27.33%), architects, engineers, and inspectors (21.04%), and 
property owners (14.32%). Table 3 summarizes these data.    17
 DEFENDANT 
PLAINTIFF Property 
Owner 
Builder Architect, 
Engineer, 
Inspector 
Manufacturer Other  Total 
Property Owner  46 131  44  98  9 328 
(71.15%) 
Builder  18 20 53  25  3 119 
(25.81%) 
Architect, 
Engineer, 
Inspector 
1 7 0  1  0  9 
(1.95%) 
Manufacturer  1 1 0  2  0  4 
(0.87%) 
Other  0 1 0  0  0  1 
(0.22%) 
Total 66 
(14.32%) 
160 
(34.71%) 
97 
(21.04%) 
126 
(27.33%) 
12 
(2.60%) 
461 
 
Table 3: Breakdown of the parties to the 461 disputes. 
 
Table 4 summarizes the application of exceptions to the ELR in our 461 cases. 
Exceptions were applied in 171 cases (37.09%). Courts applied generally recognized 
exceptions to the ELR in 114 of the 171  cases in which an exception was applied 
(66.67%) and idiosyncratic exceptions in the other 57 cases (33.33%). The most frequent 
exceptions are other property (26.31% of all cases where an exception was applied by the 
court), idiosyncratic independent duties (22.81%), and independent torts (21.64%). 
  Observations 
Generally recognized exceptions 
 Other  property 
 Independent  torts 
  Generally recognized independent duties 
Total Generally recognized exceptions 
 
45 
37 
32 
114 
Idiosyncratic exceptions 
  Idiosyncratic independent duties 
  Other reasons 
Total Idiosyncratic exceptions 
 
39 
18 
57 
Total cases where exceptions used  171 
Table 4: Outcomes of cases and frequency of exceptions. 
 
The data on means begin to tell the story of how the ELR has been applied. About 
63% of the cases apply the ELR and thus bar the plaintiff’s tort claims, while in nearly 
25% a generally recognized exception is applied instead. In the other 12% of cases, an   18
idiosyncratic exception is applied. On average, then, the ELR plus its generally 
recognized exceptions are widely but not universally accepted by state appellate courts. 
The question arises whether this acceptance has grown over time, which would suggest 
convergence. If it has grown, what exceptions have declined? If it has not grown, what 
exceptions are responsible? We address these questions next. 
 
3. AGGREGATE OUTCOMES 
  
3.1 Convergence to the “strict view” 
  We measure convergence to the strict view by asking: are courts increasingly 
applying the ELR without exceptions? If the strict view represents the efficient rule and 
the law converges to efficiency, the application of exceptions should decline over time. 
Figure 2 presents the fraction of cases each year in which exceptions were applied. It 
reveals a U-shaped pattern: the resort to exceptions declines steadily over the first 20 
years of the data but rises in the last decade. The frequency with which claims are 
rejected based on the ELR rises in the 1970s and 1980s, but falls after the mid-1990s. 
There are various ways in which to establish the U shape more formally. A simple 
quadratic model fitting case outcomes with time and time
2
 yields statistically significant 
results. The coefficient on time is -3.9453 with a t-statistic of -2.80. The coefficient on 
time
2 is 0.0009 with a t-statistic of 2.80. Both are significant at the 1% level.   19
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Figure 2: Fraction of cases that apply exceptions in each year. 
 
Figure 3 shows the trend over time of all 461 observations using Locally 
Weighted Least Squares (lowess) to fit the curve.
20 The lowess curve suggests that 
outcomes indeed follow a U-shaped curve over time, with the minimum use of exceptions 
reached in the early 1990s. We also estimate linear regressions, dividing the sample at 
various points in the late-1980s or early-1990s. These specifications yield a negative and 
statistically significant trend in the use of exceptions in the earlier subsample and a 
positive and statistically significant trend in the later one. These trends show that the law 
is not converging to the strict view of the ELR – the view that the law should always bar 
                                                 
20 We fit the lowess curve over the 461 binary observations of cases applying exceptions. The trend curve is 
an amalgam of 461 linear regressions around each local point using a localized subset of the data. This 
smoothes the data and generates a trend curve. The smoothing parameter (referred to as bandwidth) is the 
proportion of all observations that each regression uses. The smaller the bandwidth, the coarser the trend 
line appears, since individual regressions are more localized. The default bandwidth for lowess curves in 
STATA is 0.8 (meaning that each of the 461 regressions uses 369 observations), which we use throughout. 
The picture is similar with a bandwidth of 0.25.    20
recovery of economic loss in tort. In section 4, we show that the upward trend in the use 
of exceptions is partially explained by changes in plaintiffs’ claims.  
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Figure 3: Graph illustrating the significance of the downward trend in the use of exceptions from 
1970 to 1985 (t = -1.97) and the upward trend from 1988 to 2005 (t = 2.28).  The solid 
black line is a lowess curve illustrating the trend over time for all 461 observations. 
 
 3.2  Convergence to the “middle view” 
To examine convergence to the middle view, we ask whether courts are applying 
just exceptions to the ELR that are generally recognized or whether they are also 
applying idiosyncratic exceptions. Judges might experiment with many different 
exceptions to the rule in the early years of our sample. But under the middle view of 
efficiency, the application of inefficient idiosyncratic exceptions should decline over time 
as the efficient ones become generally recognized and the inefficient ones discarded, as 
the law converges to the efficient rule.   21
As shown in Figure 4, the application of both generally recognized and 
idiosyncratic exceptions trends down in the 1970s and 1980s, except that the number of 
cases decided on the basis of generally recognized exceptions bottoms out earlier, in the 
mid-1980s, at about 20% of all cases, and then begins rising gently (and not statistically 
significantly) in the mid-1990s to about 30% of all cases, with a decline at the end of the 
sample period back to 20%. Idiosyncratic exceptions fall until the mid-1990s, to about 
10% of all cases – a testament to apparent convergence to the ELR with generally 
recognized exceptions – except that they then rise toward the end of the sample period. 
Both the downward trend before the mid-1990s and the subsequent upward trend in 
idiosyncratic exceptions are significant.
21 
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Figure 4:  Fraction of all cases applying generally recognized exceptions (light gray) and 
idiosyncratic exceptions (black). 
 
                                                 
21 Simple linear tests demonstrate that the downward trend in the use of idiosyncratic exceptions before the 
mid-1990s is significant (t = -2.03 for the period 1970-1994) and the upward trend in these exceptions in 
the last ten years of our sample is also significant (t = 1.83 for the period 1995-2005). Over the last ten 
years of our sample we see significant growth of idiosyncratic exceptions as a percentage of all exceptions.   22
The real story told by these data is the growth of idiosyncratic exceptions both as 
a percentage of all cases and as a percentage of all exceptions in the last decade of the 
sample. We do not see convergence to ELR with generally recognized exceptions, and 
we thus reject the middle version of the ELR’s efficiency as well as the strict one. Yet 
had this paper been written a decade ago, we would have concluded that the legal rule 
had converged to nearly universal acceptance of the ELR with generally recognized 
exceptions. The substantial and statistically significant growth in cases decided in 
plaintiffs’ favor by application of idiosyncratic exceptions in the last decade of the 
sample precludes such a conclusion today.  
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Figure 5: Graph illustrating the fraction of cases where idiosyncratic exceptions were 
applied (light gray) as well as those cases where idiosyncratic exceptions were 
recognized as existing in the state, but not applied in the case (black). The light 
gray line is the same lowess curve as in Figure 4. 
 
We also track instances in which an idiosyncratic exception is recognized and 
approved by the court but nonetheless is not applied because the plaintiff failed to bring   23
his claim came within its scope. There are 61 such cases in our dataset. Including the 57 
cases in which idiosyncratic exceptions are applied to defeat the ELR, we have 118 cases 
(25.60% of cases in our dataset) in which idiosyncratic exceptions are recognized as 
valid. Figure 5 shows the fraction shows the trend in recognizing idiosyncratic 
exceptions, whether or not that exception applied in the case. We find a U-shaped curve 
in these data as well. The upward trend in recognition of idiosyncratic exceptions over 
the period 1995 to 2005 is significant at the 5% level (t = 2.01). This significant upward 
trend confirms our conclusion that we have not seen convergence towards the “middle 
view” of efficiency. The downward trend in the recognition of idiosyncratic exceptions 
until the mid-1990s is no longer significant. These results are further evidence against 
convergence to efficiency. 
Another way to look at the patterns is by focusing on dissents in judicial opinions; 
55 of our 461 cases include at least one dissenting opinion. Overall there is no difference 
between the frequency of dissents in cases in which the ELR is upheld and cases in which 
an exception is applied. But in cases in which the court relies on an idiosyncratic 
exception, the incidence of dissent is, as one would expect, significantly higher, as 
“idiosyncratic” implies that the law is unsettled. Only 10 of the 114 cases in which 
generally recognized exceptions were applied (8.77%) had a dissent, while 11 of the 57 
cases in which idiosyncratic exceptions were applied (19.29%) had a dissent. This 
difference is significant at the 5% level (t = 1.99). 
3.3 Summary of aggregate outcomes 
The evolution of the law reveals some fascinating patterns. The first twenty years 
after the Seely decision – the case that set the law on its modern path – are best described   24
as years of growing acceptance of the ELR, with declining application of either generally 
recognized or idiosyncratic exceptions. In the final decade of the sample, however, courts 
moved away from strict application of the doctrine by more frequently applying some of 
the generally recognized exceptions, such as the independent-tort and other-property 
exceptions, and some of the idiosyncratic exceptions as well. Courts also increasingly 
recognized idiosyncratic exceptions in cases in which they nevertheless concluded that 
the facts do not bring the plaintiff within the scope of one of them. The data reveal no 
convergence to any rule, let alone an efficient rule under either of our candidate 
definitions of efficiency. 
As noted in the introduction, we cannot reject the hypothesis that judicial 
decisions are efficient if we adopt a sufficiently broad definition of efficiency, one that 
allows for the possibility that the law and the facts are more complicated that one can 
learn from reducing a judicial opinion to a handful of variables. At one level, therefore, 
what we call the "broad" view of efficiency eludes falsifiability. Suppose there are two 
cases in two different jurisdictions, and one case applies the ELR, explicitly rejecting an 
idiosyncratic exception, and the other case rejects it, explicitly endorsing and applying 
that very exception. Both can’t be efficient at the level of doctrine, though a more 
searching investigation of each case might show that both outcomes were efficient 
because of factual differences that the opinions had not used to qualify the scope of the 
doctrine being applied.  However, the fact that dissents are more frequent when 
idiosyncratic exceptions are applied casts doubt on the hypothesis that those decisions 
would be seen as efficient if only enough details were known about them.   25
  So what is behind the time patterns we observe: both the convergence toward the 
ELR in the first 20 years of the sample and the movement away from it afterwards? In the 
next section we address this question from different perspectives.  
 
4. BEHIND THE PATTERNS 
We try to deepen our understanding of the patterns uncovered in Section 3 by 
examining five aspects of the evolution of the ELR in the construction industry. First, we 
examine the claims that plaintiffs make and ask whether changes in those claims can 
explain the patterns of court decisions. We can expect plaintiffs to try new strategies 
when they encounter barriers to recovery with old ones. Perhaps the movement away 
from the ELR in later years reflects such adaptation, as plaintiffs discover or invent 
claims to which courts are more receptive. Second, we examine whether the application 
of the ELR is influenced by the presence of an explicit contract between the parties, 
implying that they considered the various risks of their relationship. Third, we investigate 
the relative economic power of plaintiff and defendant. Judges’ sympathy for weaker 
parties may help explain deviations from the ELR in cases in which plaintiffs have less 
economic power than defendants. Fourth, we examine judicial leadership. In 1986 the 
U.S. Supreme Court issued a decision in an admiralty case, East River,
22 which broadly 
endorsed the ELR. Although East River did not involve construction and was not binding 
on state courts applying state law, we can ask whether the decision influenced those 
courts. Fifth, we examine state variation in decisions. We ask whether the lack of 
convergence to the ELR is explained by the fact that in many states there are very few 
appellate cases involving ELR in construction. Perhaps it is those states that account for 
                                                 
22 East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858 (1986).   26
lack of convergence in the aggregate while the states with the highest caseloads exhibit a 
greater tendency to convergence.  
4.1 Claims 
Figure 6 graphs the evolution of tort theories advanced by plaintiffs. The 
proportion of cases in which the plaintiff alleges negligence has been falling (statistically 
significantly) since the mid-1980s. While claims of strict liability have also trended 
downward since the beginning of our sample, the trend is significant only in some 
periods. As the ELR becomes increasingly accepted, plaintiffs are using types of claim 
less likely to be barred by it. The increase in claims of fraud is marginally significant 
since the early 1980s, while the increase in claims of negligent misrepresentation over the 
same period is strongly significant.
23 The increase in claims for “other torts” is significant 
over the course of our entire sample.
24 We get very similar trends if we look at the claims 
made in cases in which exceptions were applied, rather than simply looking at all cases. 
The change in tort theories can explain some of the increase in the use of 
generally recognized exceptions—for example, plaintiffs claim fraud and courts are 
receptive. But the changes do not explain the rise in idiosyncratic exceptions. It might 
seem that the increase in applications of idiosyncratic exceptions would stem from 
plaintiffs basing their claims on new, innovative theories that might persuade the courts 
to limit the scope of the ELR. This would imply, however, that new and different 
idiosyncratic exceptions would be applied by courts in the last ten years of our sample.  
This is not what we observe. Rather, the increase in applications of idiosyncratic 
                                                 
23 Over 1983-2005, the trend for fraud is positive and significant at the 10% level (t = 1.92). In the same 
period, the trend for negligent misrepresentation claims is positive and significant at the 1% level (t = 2.93). 
24 From 1970 to 2005, the trend for “other torts” is positive and significant at the 10% level (t = 1.78).   27
exceptions is due to courts embracing exceptions previously considered and rejected by 
other courts. 
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Figure 6: Trends in tort theories claimed by plaintiffs. 
 
4.2 ELR and the Contractual Relationship between Parties 
We consider whether judicial application of the ELR depends on whether the 
parties have an express written contract – thus excluding oral contracts, implied 
warranties, and contractual rights as a third-party beneficiary of someone else’s contract. 
If the courts want to promote efficiency, they may be more willing to apply the ELR 
when the parties had defined their relationship in a contract, since the parties presumably 
have a better idea of the optimal terms of their relationship than a judge would have. 
  Cases  Exceptions%  Idiosyncratic%
Parties did not have an express written contract  288  39.27%  14.58% 
Parties did have an express written contract  173  33.53%  8.67% 
Table 5: Breakdown of incidence of all exceptions and incidence of idiosyncratic exceptions depending on 
whether parties had an express written contract. 
   28
We see in Table 5 that the percentage of cases that apply exceptions is indeed 
greater when plaintiffs do not have an express written contract. But the difference is not 
significant (t = 1.42). Courts are, however, significantly more likely to apply 
idiosyncratic exceptions when the parties do not have a contract (t = 1.87). These courts 
in effect “make” a contract for the plaintiff rather than penalizing him for having failed to 
negotiate a contract that would have protected him from the loss that he is suing to 
recover. The reason that some courts are more likely to use idiosyncratic than generally 
recognized exceptions may be that those courts are not committed to the position that 
when transaction costs are low, parties should be forced to define their mutual duties in a 
contract rather than requiring the courts to do so in the name of tort law. 
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Figure 7: Use of exceptions and use of idiosyncratic exceptions when parties have an express 
contract. 
 
If courts are moving toward efficiency, the incidence of exceptions in those cases 
where parties have an express written contract should fall over time.  The data in Figure 7   29
do not support this hypothesis.  Both the use of exceptions and the use of idiosyncratic 
exceptions rise significantly after 1997 when parties have an express contract. 
 
4.3 Relative Economic Power of the Parties 
  Table 6 divides parties into two groups on the basis of rough proxies for economic 
power. Table 7 shows the rate of plaintiff recovery and application of idiosyncratic 
exceptions for the four types of plaintiff-defendant combinations. 
Weak parties  Strong parties 
•  Individual property owners and tenants 
•  Associations of residents 
•  Subcontractors and small builders 
•  Commercial property owners 
•  Public property owners 
•  General contractors 
•  Developers 
•  Architects and engineers 
•  Inspectors 
•  Manufacturers 
•  Suppliers 
•  Other parties (banks, insurance 
companies, real estate agents) 
Table 6: Broad division of parties into “weak” and “strong”.  
 
Relationship Cases  (%)  Exceptions %  Idiosyncratic %
Weak plaintiff – weak defendant  73 (15.84%)  43.86%  12.33% 
Weak plaintiff – strong defendant  152 (32.97%)  38.15%  17.64% 
Strong plaintiff – weak defendant  34 (7.38%)  35.29%  17.64% 
Strong plaintiff – strong defendant  202 (43.82%)  33.66%  7.43% 
Table 7: Breakdown of the incidence of all exceptions and the incidence of idiosyncratic exceptions by 
relative economic power of the parties. 
 
There is no statistically significant difference between the groups in the courts’ 
use of exceptions overall. Courts, however, are more likely to apply an idiosyncratic 
exception when facing a weak plaintiff and strong defendant (17.64% of cases) compared 
to cases in which both parties are strong (7.43% of cases). This difference is highly 
significant (t = 2.97). But the application of idiosyncratic exceptions is also higher when 
courts face a strong plaintiff and a weak defendant (17.64%) than when both parties are 
strong (t = 1.89). No other differences are significant. This evidence mildly supports the   30
hypothesis that sympathy moves courts to use idiosyncratic exceptions to help weak 
plaintiffs.    
Multivariate regression analysis confirms the above results, controlling for state 
and time fixed effects. Table 8 illustrates that the relative strength of the parties does not 
significantly affect the application of exceptions overall (specifications (1) through (4)), 
but it does affect the application of idiosyncratic exceptions. Specifications (5) through 
(8) indicate that courts are more likely to introduce an idiosyncratic exception when 
parties do not have an express contract and when the plaintiff is weak.   
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
DEPVAR  exception exception exception exception  idiosyn idiosyn idiosyn idiosyn 
          
Express Contract  -0.0621  -0.0683 -0.0625 -0.0659  -0.0542* -0.0660**  -0.0517 -0.0601* 
  (0.0475) (0.0490) (0.0477) (0.0492) (0.0322) (0.0330) (0.0323) (0.0330) 
 
Strong  Plaintiff  -0.0376 -0.0509 -0.0374 -0.0511  -0.0621** -0.0788** -0.0633** -0.0794** 
  (0.0465) (0.0500) (0.0466) (0.0500) (0.0316) (0.0337) (0.0316) (0.0335) 
 
Strong  Defendant  -0.0711 -0.0798 -0.0708 -0.0814 -0.0172 -0.0244 -0.0194 -0.0285 
  (0.0556) (0.0563) (0.0557) (0.0564) (0.0377) (0.0379) (0.0378) (0.0378) 
 
State Controls  No  Yes  No Yes No Yes No Yes 
 
Time Controls  No  No  Yes Yes No   No Yes Yes 
 
Observations  461 461 461 461 461 461 461 461 
R-squared  0.0096 0.1392 0.0096 0.1400 0.0178 0.1587 0.0201 0.1682 
F  1.477 1.456* 1.108 1.430*  2.755** 1.698*** 2.340** 1.777*** 
Standard  errors  in  parentheses           
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
Table 8: Multivariate regression (OLS) illustrating the effects of contractual relationships between the 
parties and their relative economic power on the incidence of all exceptions and the incidence of 
idiosyncratic exceptions. 
 
4.4 The U.S. Supreme Court’s Decision in East River  
In East River (1986) the Supreme Court strongly endorsed the ELR. A plaintiff 
shipbuilder had a contract with the defendant to design, manufacture, and install turbines 
for four supertankers. The ships malfunctioned and were damaged, and the plaintiff 
sought to recover the costs of repair, plus income lost while the ships were out of service. 
The plaintiff initially made claims in both contract and tort; but the contract claims turned   31
out to be barred by the statute of limitations. The negligence claims were rejected by the 
Supreme Court, which held that customer dissatisfaction with product quality is not a 
cognizable claim in admiralty tort law. Following the reasoning in Seely, the Court held 
that such claims can be brought only as claims for breach of warranty.  
Although the East River decision was not binding on state courts, we examine 
whether it had a significant influence on them in construction cases. Influence is difficult 
to ascertain here, since, as we showed in Section 3, the use of exceptions had been 
trending down for at least a decade before East River and bottomed out later, in the early 
1990s. We find no effect of East River on the speed of convergence.  
Another way to assess influence is by number of citations. Since East River 
denies recovery, we expect that state court decisions that cite East River are likely to  
deny liability. Indeed, 52 of the 68 cases (76.47%) in our sample that cite East River deny 
the plaintiff recovery while only 196 of the 310 cases since East River that do not cite the 
case deny recovery (63.22%). This difference is significant (t = 2.17). Still, one needs to 
be cautious: cases that cite East River may do so as cover, trading on the prestige of the 
Supreme Court, whereas cases that do not cite East River can justify not citing it on the 
ground that an admiralty case is irrelevant to construction disputes. If this explanation is 
correct, the citation evidence yields some support for the “legal realist” hypothesis that 
state courts do what they want and use citations to provide rhetorical support for their 
conclusions.  
While East River may have had some influence in consolidating support for the 
ELR, the proportion of cases citing the decision has fallen since the early 1990s. This 
trend is significant (t = -2.24 for years 1990-2005). We cannot conclude from our data   32
that the U.S. Supreme Court has had a major influence on the state courts’ treatment of 
ELR, at least in the construction industry. 
4.5 Variation across States  
There is tremendous variation in the application of exceptions across states. 
Kentucky has only cases that apply exceptions to the ELR, while Wyoming, Kansas, 
Virginia, and Maine have no cases that apply exceptions. We ask whether the use of 
exceptions can be explained by geographical or economic differences; the answer appears 
to be no.
25 We ask whether the differences in the use of exceptions can be explained by 
the methods by which judges are selected and retained that different states employ, and 
again the answer is no.
26 Nor can the differences in the use of exceptions be explained by 
differences among judges in political ideology.
27 
Might state courts that have the most experience with the ELR have greater 
respect for the doctrine? To examine this hypothesis, we focus on the five states with the 
highest ELR caseloads. The incidence of exceptions turns out to vary greatly in these 
                                                 
25 Testing for differences in the use of exceptions across regions does not yield any notable patterns. 
Testing for differences based on levels of economic growth in each state from 1970 to 2005 generates 
insignificant results; and testing for differences based on growth in the construction industry in each state 
from 1970 to 2005 also yields insignificant results.  
26 States differ in the method by which judges are appointed and retained. We use the categories employed 
in Choi, Gulati, and E. Posner (2007) to divide states into four types of judicial selection method 
(appointed, merit-selected, partisan election, nonpartisan election). The methods by which judges are 
retained are highly correlated with the method of selection. The differences in the use of exceptions across 
states of different judicial selection methods are not significant. 
27 Using a simple measure of party-adjusted surrogate judicial ideology (“PAJID”) from Brace, Langer, and 
Hall (2000), we test whether the ideology of the Supreme Court judges in a given state can help explain the 
variation in the use of exceptions across states. In the cases in which the court upheld the ELR to preclude 
recovery, the average PAJID score was 47.20. In those cases where an exception was used, the average 
PAJID score was 47.46. The difference is not significant (t = 0.1817).   33
states (see Table 9). New York is very strict on plaintiffs, applying exceptions to the ELR 
in a mere 15.91% of cases, while California is far more lenient (52.94%).
28 
STATE  Total cases  Exceptions  Exception% Idiosyncratic Idiosyncratic%
CA  34 18  52.94  3  8.82 
FL  47 19  40.43  3  6.38 
OH  32 12  37.50  2  6.25 
IL  56 18  32.14  4  7.14 
NY  44 7  15.91  2  4.55 
Total 213  74  34.74  14  6.57 
Table 9: Incidence of all exceptions and incidence of idiosyncratic exceptions in five states with highest 
caseloads. 
 
Not only do the averages differ greatly across the five busiest states; so do the 
trends among the five states (Figure 8). The application of exceptions in California is 
high on average but significantly decreasing over time (t = -2.62), while the application 
of exceptions in New York and Illinois is considerably less frequent but becoming more 
so. In Florida there has been a highly significant increase in the application of exceptions 
since the early 1980s (t = 3.49).  
Across all states in our sample, the incidence of exceptions is not significantly 
correlated with the number of cases decided in a state. The proportion of cases that apply 
idiosyncratic exceptions is, however, correlated with caseload. A simple linear regression 
indicates that states with higher caseloads use idiosyncratic exceptions less frequently (t = 
-2.85). This negative relationship is even stronger in the cases that recognize, without 
necessarily applying, idiosyncratic exceptions (t = -3.41). The implication is that 
idiosyncratic exceptions are more likely to be applied when courts have less experience 
with the ELR in construction cases. This hypothesis is further supported by a comparison 
of the first ten decisions heard in each state with the subsequent decisions in those states 
                                                 
28 New York’s position may reflect the prestige and continuing influence of Judge Benjamin Cardozo, the 
author of the Ultramares opinion (note 4 above), which continues in New York to block third-party suits 
against auditors, though a majority of other states have abandoned that application of the ELR.   34
(restricting the sample to those states that hear more than ten cases). The early cases are 
significantly more likely both to apply idiosyncratic exceptions (t = 2.56) and to 
recognize them (t = 2.53) than the later cases. 
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Figure 8: Use of exceptions over time in the five states with the highest caseloads. 
 
The punch line of this analysis is that light ELR caseloads in some states might 
explain why we have not seen stronger national convergence to the ELR, and more 
specifically why we have seen an increase in the application of idiosyncratic exceptions 
in the past decade. Although the ELR is widely accepted, the law has not come to a rest 
and states continue experimenting, often in ways inconsistent with the ELR and its 
generally recognized exceptions. Experience slows this experimentation, but does not 
stop it. 
The increase in the application of idiosyncratic exceptions is not limited to states 
with low caseloads. In fact, 76% of the cases that apply idiosyncratic exceptions since   35
1997 have come from states with 10 or more cases. Wisconsin (the state with the sixth 
highest caseload) has seen a sharp rise in cases decided by the application of idiosyncratic 
exceptions. Four of the five largest states have applied an idiosyncratic exception in the 
last six years of our sample. Thus, even in busy states we see an increasing tendency of 
courts to apply idiosyncratic exceptions to the ELR. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
Over the 35 years covered by our study, the ELR has evolved in a way that cannot 
be easily described as convergence to efficiency. While over the first quarter century the 
law moved significantly toward adopting the ELR with generally recognized exceptions, 
over the last decade it has moved away from this equilibrium. Had we written this paper 
ten years ago, we would have found the law converging to ELR with generally 
recognized exceptions, but the law moved away from that rule afterward with no changes 
in the economic environment to explain the movement. Moreover, the law has evolved 
very differently in different states, which is inconsistent with efficiency in the absence of 
evidence of relevant economic differences in construction disputes across states.  
The lack of convergence does not mean that judicial behavior is random or that 
the law is entirely unpredictable. The lack of nationwide convergence is consistent with 
settled law in individual states. And on average in our sample, courts applied the ELR 
with generally recognized exceptions about 88% of the time, although in about 15% of 
these cases the courts accepted the validity of idiosyncratic exceptions but did not think 
the facts warranted their application. Overall, idiosyncratic exceptions were recognized 
by appellate courts in about 25% of cases. But many states are increasingly applying   36
idiosyncratic exceptions to limit the ELR, and the amount of appellate litigation 
involving the ELR in construction disputes is growing. These are not signs of the law 
settling down.  
Some additional evidence developed in this study sheds light on how legal 
evolution works. Plaintiffs’ claims respond to what courts are receptive to, such as claims 
of fraud. But that is not the whole story. The key reason for nonconvergence is that courts 
distinguish earlier cases and create idiosyncratic exceptions to the prevailing legal 
doctrine that other courts reject. In the last decade covered by our study, courts 
increasingly applied such exceptions even when the parties had express contracts and so 
might have been thought unsympathetic tort claimants. 
Idiosyncratic exceptions differ across states, with many states going in their own 
direction. State courts at first responded to a nonbinding 1986 U.S. Supreme Court ruling 
embracing the bright-line ELR in an admiralty case, but its influence declined over time. 
There is evidence that state courts with heavier caseloads in this area of litigation are 
more likely to converge to the adoption of the ELR with generally recognized exceptions, 
but even in those states there is residual uncertainty.  
We conclude that appellate courts exercise a significant amount of discretion in 
deciding cases, leaving the law far from certain even after three and a half decades of 
evolution. The deviations from efficiency do not disappear over time. There may be 
evolutionary benefits of such legal flexibility, but the hypothesis that, in commercial 
fields, the common law is predictable and efficient, or at least is moving there, is not 
supported by our study. It would be illuminating, in this regard, to examine legal   37
evolution in other areas of law; we would expect the pressures for efficiency outside the 
purely economic environments such as construction to be weaker.   38
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Appendix: Construction of the Database 
 
All data were obtained from the LexisNexis “Construction” library. To find the 
cases, we searched the library for state appeals court cases decided prior to December 31, 
2005, that satisfy the following criteria: (1) the phrase “economic loss” is found in either 
the  Overview or the Core Terms; and (2) any of the following terms—“contract!”, 
“agree!”, or “warrant!”—are found in the Overview or the Core Terms. The Overview is a 
summary of the case of approximately 150 to 200 words. The Core Terms is a list of 30 
to 50 key terms that appear in the decision. This search strategy captures all state appeals 
cases from the construction industry where the ELR defense is raised by defense lawyers. 
No issue of different coverage periods for different states arises in our sample period. 
This search yielded 1171 cases. Of these, 209 were not appellate cases and so 
were dropped, and another 4 were not from state courts. Another 496 cases were 
excluded as irrelevant because the LexisNexis Construction library turns out to include 
cases that do not pertain to construction. In 50 cases, more than one dispute is addressed 
on appeal. For example, a plaintiff may bring claims against the general contractor and 
subcontractors in one case. When the plaintiff brings different claims against the two 
defendants and both claims are being heard on appeal, we divide the case into two 
distinct observations. When the plaintiff brings claims against multiple defendants but the 
appeal addresses only one of them, it is left as one observation. We have 46 cases that 
give rise to 2 observations and 4 cases that give rise to 3 observations; the other 412 cases 
involve single claims decided on appeal. Of the 516 individual disputes thus coded, 39 do 
not involve tort claims and another 16 involve tort claims that were not appealed. After 
removing these 55 disputes, we have our sample of 461 observations. 